For over a century, Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war and upheaval. After every war a common perception and hope of lasting peace begins to surface. However, as the history has shown, no peace in Afghanistan has been of permanent nature, with the struggle for power continuing across the decades. This lack of stability has led to repeated humanitarian crises, leaving millions displaced from their homes and vulnerable in other countries. Notwithstanding a number of international interventions and peace agreements, conflict continues, often with even greater intensity and magnitude.
The same perception of peace emerged when the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in 2021. Many experts argued that with the rise of the Taliban, Afghanistan would now see stability. However, that did not materialize. As soon as the Taliban took charge in Kabul, various groups took up arms against them, and a new phase of instability began. The recent trouble, which has the potential to transition into a full-blown civil war, has emerged between Kabul and Kandahar. The two groups are currently fighting an unannounced war.
Founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the 1970s, the Haqqani network emerged as a formidable militant organization during the anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Over time, it developed a reputation for well-planned insurgent operations and has been successful in maintaining a distinct command structure, even while aligning with the Taliban. This semi-independent status underpins differing approaches and priorities compared to the central Taliban leadership.
In recent months, this ideological difference has escalated into violent discord. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting Interior Minister and a prominent figure within the Haqqani network, has publicly criticized the central leadership for monopolizing power and neglecting the needs of the populace. In a speech, he emphasized the importance of gaining public trust and warned against the dangers of centralized authority. The reclusive nature of Akhundzada and his tight grip on decision-making have been points of contention. The Haqqani network’s calls for a more inclusive governance approach contrast with Akhundzada’s centralized control, leading to internal friction.
Prior to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Haqqani was a symbol of terror in Afghanistan. He topped the chart of America’s most wanted in Afghanistan, with a bounty of $10 million on his head. Since the U.S. left, he has taken a completely different form. He has presented himself as a practical statesman, a trustworthy diplomat, and a voice of relative moderation in a government entrenched in religious extremism. This new version of Sirajuddin Haqqani illustrates a rift that has emerged within the Taliban over major policy issues. While the Haqqani group seeks moderation, the central command of the Taliban, led by Sheikh Haibatullah, has been vying for the establishment of a conservative Islamic state governed by strict Islamic principles.
This ideological difference took a violent turn when Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, was assassinated on December 11, 2024. Concerns were raised that, being a part of the Haqqani group, he had been eliminated by the Haibatullah group. After that, speculations arose that the Taliban Amir was on the verge of dismissing Haqqani from the position of acting Interior Minister of the Taliban regime. Amid all this discussion, the minister himself left Afghanistan mysteriously.
On January 21, 2025, Siraj went to United Arab Emirates (UAE). His long absence that exceeded 50 days, became a topic of speculation in Afghanistan. Haqqani made a public appearance in Khost province on March 14, 2025. Immediately after his arrival, reports started to emerge that Haqqani had resigned from his position in the interim Afghan government. However, the ministry spokesperson, Ul Mateen Qani, dismissed the claims. He called them false and urged media outlets to stop spreading “propaganda far from reality.”
However, even if Haqqani does not resign, one thing is certain: there are deep-rooted differences between Kandahar and Kabul. Both factions have broad disagreements on how the affairs of government should be run. While Mullah Haibatullah, who is the spiritual head of the Taliban government, presses for an inward-looking conservative Islamic government with little or no space for the education and employment of women, the Haqqani group has taken a completely different line. It has been advocating for an inclusive form of government in which the rights of minorities are not only regarded but also respected. In one of his statements, Sirajuddin Haqqani criticized Haibatullah, saying, “One should not think that just because I am the ruler, everyone must accept my words, and if they don’t, the sky will fall.”
The Haqqani group also has disagreements with Haibatullah on how foreign affairs should be conducted. In this regard, relations with Pakistan are very important. While the Mullah Haibatullah-led Taliban have rejected calls by Pakistan to neutralize terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan, the Haqqani group has been calling for improved relations with Pakistan due to its historical ties with the Pakistani security establishment. According to Najam Sethi, if a civil war were to break out between the Taliban and the Haqqani group, Pakistan would take the side of the latter in its bid to uproot terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan. Thus, it is highly possible that Afghanistan could become a battleground for a proxy war in the future. If anything like this happens, Afghanistan would once again enter a phase of war, continuing the cycle that has persisted for the past 100 years.
Whatever happens in Afghanistan, it would have a spillover effect throughout the region. Regional and global powers should seriously consider the situation in Afghanistan to prevent any escalation between the Taliban groups. Afghanistan is already going through a severe humanitarian crisis and any war would make the situation even more dismal.
AUTHOR
Obaid ur Rehman holds a degree in International Relations from the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) in Islamabad. His areas of interest include China studies, regional affairs, and human rights.
