In his long-awaited South Asia plan announced last week, US President Donald Trump sent a clear message to Afghanistan that the US military and financial support towards the country would no longer be a ‘blank check’ while demanding of the Afghan government to take more responsibility towards peace and economic development in the country. He also criticized its ally of 16 years in the war on terror, Pakistan, and called it out to take action against its ‘alleged’ terrorist safe havens, stating that Pakistan needed to demonstrate a commitment towards ‘civilisation, order and peace’ and.
Surprisingly, Trump’s speech also revealed a ‘forced entry and role’ of India in Afghanistan’s future development and stability. As he appreciated USA’s strategic partnership with India, Trump ‘hoped’ that New Delhi would be of assistance to the US in ensuring long-term peace and stability in South Asia, especially because India made ‘billions from trade’ with the US. On Taliban’s front, on the other hand, Trump kept the door open for reconciliation in the future. “Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan,” said Trump.
Following the allegations, Pakistan’s sole silver lining on Tuesday became China’s explicit support of Pakistan and its snubbing of Trump’s statement. China called on the international community to acknowledge Pakistan’s efforts and sacrifices in counter-terrorism in the region.
In the wake of these developments, in recent talks with US and Afghan officials, Pakistani civil and military leadership conveyed a few categorical messages;
* Pakistan remains committed to peace in Afghanistan as much as it is for its own soil. Additionally, Pakistan would unconditionally support any regional initiative, be it the Quadrilateral Support Group or Moscow initiatives, in order to pursue some breakthrough in the stalled peace process.
* Pakistan continues to believe in and pursue regional economic activity, very much in the spirit of its partnership with China through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is also one such initiative through which, by bringing Afghanistan on board, the aim of regional economic activity could be achieved.
* In terms of foreign military policies, Pakistan does not agree with the Afghan demand of a third-party verification of counter-terrorism actions, either here or in Afghanistan. This is because third-party verification and monitoring is complicated and fraught with risks due to absence of trust between the two countries. Pakistan wants to develop a bilateral engagement mechanism in the light of the March 15 meeting between Sartaj Aziz – the then adviser to prime minister – and the Afghan National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar.
* On border control, Pakistan wants to institute a bilateral border management mechanism to strengthen controls over cross-border movement of terrorists. Apparently, Afghan leadership wants to address the issue of security first. This is rooted in the raging Taliban-Daesh (IS) insurgency that claims dozens of lives every day. In early August, a joint Taliban-Daesh attack in Mirza Olang village in Sayyad district of Sari Pul killed dozens of people. Even though the Taliban categorically denied any such joint operation, local witness accounts contradicted Taliban’s claims. Such operations could pose a major threat not only for the security forces in Afghanistan, but also for major regional stakeholders who had previously treated both the militant groups with a different prism.
In the light of the developing situation, it is understandable that it is becoming difficult for Afghan President Ghani and other leaders to push the peace process. Afghans are also wary of abrupt border closures by Pakistani authorities. Thus, this leads to the question of why should Pakistan make its policy contingent upon that of the Trump administration?
There has never before been a greater convergence among USA, India and Afghanistan, presumably against Pakistan and its allies. As of late, they speak with the same tone as far as their view on Pakistan is concerned. With such narratives, it makes it difficult for the Pakistani policymakers to formulate a joint regional security policy.
However, setting aside these messages, Pakistan’s foreign policy woes are not confined to US-Afghanistan-India alone. Of late, even Chinese leaders have been politely asking Pakistan to do something demonstrable as far as indiscriminate counter-terrorism measures are concerned. Chinese deputy foreign minister and other officials have reportedly referred to the negative perception – which they see as the Indo-US-Afghan narrative on Pakistan – that keeps generating in important capitals.
Admittedly, Pakistan needs to have a clear and direct policy-oriented approach if it needs to take its allies on board and implement effective counter-terror policies on the Pak-Afghan border.
Not only is it beset with its own internal dynamics at the moment, it lacks a clear vision on terrorism and extremism and remains fearful of a direct confrontation with the Afghan and Pakistani proponents of ‘jihadism’, i.e., Taliban and al Qaeda.
It seems that with the semblance of control over the spiral of terrorism in Pakistan, Pakistani officials are afraid to ruffle the hornet’s nest at home. These fears, however, reinforce Chinese officials’ concerns that Pakistan is in dire need of formulating a clear counter-terror policy – both domestic and regional – if it is to achieve across the board consensus on the issue. As for Afghanistan’s future and peace, Washington might have finally acknowledged that a military solution would never succeed in Afghanistan. Hence, regional diplomacy initiatives – involving China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan – with active participation of US, India and Afghanistan provide a viable solution to a war that currently appears endless. Whatever is contrary to this plausible strategy would only result in exacerbating the Afghan conflict, bringing in only more regional havoc than stability or peace.
This article is written by Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, and Farooq Yousaf who is a Research Fellow and Programme Consultant at CRSS.
© Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) and Afghan Studies Center (ASC), Islamabad.
